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Abstract
This paper conducts a comparative analysis of the performances of the forward 
guidance strategies adopted by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Norges 
Bank and the Riksbank, with the aim to gauge whether forward guidance via 
publication of an own interest rate path enhances a central bank’s ability to steer 
market expectations. Two main results emerge. First, we find evidence that all 
three central banks have been highly predictable in their monetary policy decisions 
and that long-term inflation expectations have been well anchored in the three 
economies, irrespective of whether forward guidance involved publication of an 
own interest rate path or not. Second, for New Zealand, we find weak evidence that 
a publication of a path could potentially enhance a central bank’s leverage on the 
medium term structure of interest rates. 
Keywords: Monetary policy, transparency, central bank communication, forward 
guidance, term structure of interest rates 
JEL Classification: E40, E43, E52 5
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Non-Technical Summary 
The perceived primary advantage of publishing an own interest rate path is that 
it would enhance the central banks ability to steer expectations, thereby enhancing the 
predictability of monetary policy, the anchoring of inflation expectations and the 
leverage of monetary policy over longer term interest rates. In order to assess this 
hypothesis, we perform two types of comparative analyses focusing on the incidence 
of monetary policy surprises and their effects on longer term bond yields. First, a 
comparative analysis is conducted for the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) and 
the Swedish Riksbank over a sample period where the RBNZ but not the Riksbank 
published an own interest path, while otherwise both central banks operated under 
fairly similar conditions and policy frameworks. Second, we perform a comparative 
analysis for the Norges Bank over two different sub-samples periods, where an 
interest rate path was published in the second sub-sample but not in the first. 
Two main results emerge. First, we find evidence that all three central banks 
have been highly predictable in their monetary policy decisions and that long-term 
inflation expectations have been well anchored in the three economies, irrespective of 
whether forward guidance involved publication of an own interest rate path or not. 
Second, for New Zealand, we find weak evidence that a publication of a path may 
potentially enhance a central bank’s leverage on the medium term structure of interest 
rates.6
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1 Introduction 
Over the past decade central banks around the world have gradually moved towards 
establishing more transparency in their conduct of monetary policy, see Dincer and 
Eichengreen (2007) and Geraats (2008). In particular, increasing emphasis is being 
given to effective communication of the prospective future course of monetary policy. 
The standard practice amongst central banks is to provide forward guidance via a 
projection or forecast of their goal variables (mainly inflation and real economic 
growth) and other standard channels, such as press conferences, statements and 
speeches. A few inflation-targeting central banks have gone one step further and give 
quantitative forward guidance by publishing their own projection or forecast of the 
future path of policy rates. This practice is currently pursued by four inflation 
targeters, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (since 1997), Norges Bank (since 2005)
1, 
the Swedish Riksbank (since 2007), and the Czech National Bank (since 2008). The 
vast majority of central banks, in particular the leading non-inflation targeting central 
banks, the Federal Reserve, the ECB and the Bank of Japan, but also the Bank of 
England as one of the leading inflation targeting central banks,
2 have so far decided 
against publishing an own interest rate path. 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the main argument brought up in favour of 
publishing an own interest rate path by the central bank is that it would enhance the 
central bank’s ability to manage expectations and thereby facilitate the transmission 
of monetary policy (Woodford 2005, Svensson 2006 and 2008, Rudebusch and 
Williams 2008). This is also the primary perceived advantage of publishing an own 
interest rate path from the perspective of central banks that have adopted this tool 
(Rosenberg 2007, Gjedrem 2006). More specifically, it is held that by publishing an 
own interest rate path, a central bank can in principle steer expectations and thereby 
enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy in a number of ways: 
 
(i) by steering market expectations of near-term policy rate decisions, 
publication of an own interest rate path can enhance the predictability of 
monetary policy, i.e. help to avoid policy surprises and thereby reduce 
financial market volatility; 7
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(ii) publishing a policy rate path may help to signal the central bank's 
commitment to maintain price stability, and thus lead to a better anchoring of 
long-term inflation expectations; and 
(iii) announcing a policy path may enhance the central bank's leverage over 
medium and longer-term interest rates by enabling it not only to change the 
current level of policy rates but also to quantitatively signal changes in the 
prospective future path of policy rates. 
 
These are, in principle, testable hypotheses. (i) implies that monetary policy surprises, 
i.e. the deviations between the prior market expectation and the outcome of a policy 
rate decision, are on average smaller when the central bank publishes an interest rate 
path. (ii) should imply lower responsiveness of longer-term interest rates to incoming 
macroeconomic news and monetary policy surprises. Finally, (iii) would imply that 
the central bank can have a stronger influence on medium and longer term yields by 
being able to quantitatively shape market expectations of the future path of policy 
rates. 
 
The bulk of the empirical literature on the effects of central bank transparency and 
communication on monetary policy effectiveness is focused on the world’s leading 
central banks and only a very few studies address the implications of the publication 
of the central bank’s own interest rate path.
3 For reasons of sample length, these 
studies exclusively focus on the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) and Norges 
Bank.
4 Some of these studies have also touched upon the issues examined in this 
paper, namely quantitative forward guidance and the effect on (i) predictability, (ii) 
anchoring of long-term inflation expectations and (iii) potential leverage on the term 
structure of interest rates. Regarding the effects of quantitative forward guidance on 
predictability, there is some evidence suggesting that publication of an interest rate 
path reduces the volatility of short-term interest rates, implying that it may have 
enhanced predictability (Holmsen et al. 2008 and Ferrero and Secchi 2007).
5 
Concerning the anchoring of inflation expectations, there is only one study on New 
Zealand (Drew and Karagedikli 2008) which finds that the impact of monetary policy 
surprises diminishes at longer horizons, which is interpreted as implying that inflation 
expectations are well anchored. However, it remains open what role the publication of 
an interest rates path plays in this result.
6 A number of studies have explored the 8
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implications of the RBNZ’s quantitative forward guidance on monetary policy 
leverage over short- to medium-term market interest rates (Archer 2005, Ferrero and 
Secchi 2007, Moessner and Nelson 2008). The results suggest that RBNZ’s policy 
path surprises do have a positive but weak effect on market interest rates. This 
evidence is, however, not informative with regard to the question if a release of an 
interest rate path enhances a central bank’s leverage over market interest rates, as such 
an assessment would require a comparison with other central banks that do not 
publish such a path. 
 
This brief review of the existing empirical literature reveals that the incremental 
impact of publishing an own interest rate path on the three different aspects of policy 
effectiveness highlighted above has so far not been addressed in a consistent manner. 
The contribution of this paper is to fill this gap by developing a comparative approach 
for testing all three of the above stated hypotheses, based on a consistent analytical 
framework. The main challenge in this regard is to design appropriate comparisons in 
order to be able to assess the incremental effect of communicating policy intentions 
by means of an interest rate path. One possible way is to compare two central banks 
which operate under similar monetary policy frameworks but differ in the sense that 
one of them is publishing a policy rate path and the other not. Another possible way is 
to compare the performance of one central bank over two different periods in which 
the policy framework was similar except that a policy rate path was published in one 
period but not in the other. 
 
In the following we perform both types of comparison. First, a comparative analysis is 
conducted for the RBNZ and the Swedish Riksbank over the period March 1999 
(when the RBNZ switched from an MCI targeting framework to an operational 
framework centred on steering the overnight cash rate) to February 2007 (when the 
Riksbank first published an own interest rate path). Over this sample period the 
RBNZ regularly published an own interest rate forecast, while the Riksbank published 
an inflation forecast but not an interest rate forecast. Otherwise both central banks 
operated under fairly similar conditions and policy frameworks: Both central banks 
operate in a small open economy environment and have policy frameworks 
characterised by direct inflation targeting
7 and a high degree of transparency,
8 and 9
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their forecasts are released (via their regular publications) on days when monetary 
policy decisions are also taken. The latter is important for our analysis of hypothesis 
(iii) as we explain in more detail below. The lack of coincidence of the forecast 
release and monetary policy decisions is also the reason why other leading inflation 
targeting central banks, most notably the Bank of England, are excluded from the 
analysis.  
 
Second, we also perform a comparative analysis for Norges Bank over two different 
periods, covering the periods March 2001 to October 2005 and November 2005 to 
June 2007. The start and end points of the two samples are determined by Norges 
Bank's switch from exchange rate to inflation targeting in March 2001,
9 the first 
publication of an own policy rate forecast (in addition to the inflation forecast) in 
November 2005 and the outbreak of the global financial turmoil in June 2007. As 
described in more detail below we derive monetary policy surprises from money 
market interest rates. Since the financial market turmoil led to an unprecedented 
increase in the level and the volatility of risk premia in money market rates from July 
2007, these rates became an unreliable gauge of market expectations of future policy 
rates. 
 
The empirical analysis of the paper is based on daily data and focuses on monetary 
policy ‘news’ or ‘surprises’, i.e. the unexpected part of an announced change in the 
monetary policy stance. The focus on the surprise components is motivated by the 
insight that financial asset prices are forward-looking and should therefore only 
respond to unexpected monetary policy (or any other macroeconomic) 
announcements. Following Gürkaynak et al. (2007), two types of monetary policy 
surprises are identified: target and path surprises. The former quantifies to what extent 
market participants have been able to anticipate the actual outcome of an interest rate 
decision (based on the change in short-term interest rates surrounding the policy 
decision) whereas the path surprise gauges the surprise component embedded in the 
forward-looking guidance (derived from one year ahead implied forward rates ). 
 
After deriving target and path surprises, we move on to test hypotheses (i) to (iii). The 
first hypothesis is assessed on the basis of straightforward descriptive analysis. To this 10
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end, we compare the magnitude of target and path surprises across the three 
economies. The second hypothesis, the anchoring of yield curves, is tested by 
estimating the effect of monetary policy surprises as well as of a number of key pieces 
of domestic and global (i.e. US and euro area) macroeconomic news on long-term 
government bond yields across three maturities (five and ten-year spot yields and the 
five-year forward rates expected to prevail in five years’ time). The third hypothesis, 
to what extent announcement of a policy path enhances the central bank's leverage 
over longer-term interest rates, is tested by examining whether the medium and long-
term yield effect of path surprises is stronger on the days when the central bank 
publishes its interest rate path forecast or not. This part of the analysis benefits from 
the fact that all three central banks under investigation pursue the practice of releasing 
their forward guidance, i.e. their Inflation or Monetary Policy Reports with their 
forecasts, on days when monetary policy decisions are also taken. 
 
The main findings of the paper are the following. First, we find that all three central 
banks have been highly predictable in their monetary policy decisions and that long-
term inflation expectations have been well anchored in the three economies, 
irrespective of whether forward guidance involved publication of an own interest rate 
path or not. The first comparative analysis reveals that monetary policy surprises are 
found to be of similar magnitude for both the RBNZ and the Riksbank, and that there 
is no evidence that long-term yields are better anchored in New Zealand than in 
Sweden. The sub-sample analysis for Norges Bank reveals that policy surprises have 
become smaller after November 2005, when Norges Bank started to publish an 
interest rate path. This latter period was, however, also characterised by very low 
volatility in the global economy and financial markets in general, which might also 
have contributed to lower policy surprises. Regarding long-term inflation expectations 
in Norway, there is no evidence that they have been better anchored after November 
2005 than before. These findings suggest that if the central bank already operates 
under a monetary policy framework characterised by a clearly defined price stability 
objective and a high degree of transparency, publication of an interest rate path does 
not appear to enhance the short-term predictability of monetary policy or the 
anchoring of long-term inflation expectations. 
 11
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The second main finding, obtained from the comparison between the RBNZ and the 
Riksbank, is that the publication of an interest rate path appears to increase the 
sensitivity of medium term bond yields to forward-looking monetary policy news and 
to reduce the sensitivity of bond yields to news about the current policy stance. In 
New Zealand, five-year bond yields are found to respond more weakly to the target 
surprise and substantially more strongly to the forward looking path surprise on the 
days when the RBNZ publishes its interest rate path. In contrast to this, bond yields in 
Sweden are not found to have responded differently to monetary policy surprises on 
the days when the Riksbank published its report with the inflation forecast. This 
empirical finding suggests that explicit quantitative guidance, in the form of the 
publication of an interest rate path, may potentially enhance a central bank's leverage 
on the medium term structure of interest rates. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses a few 
conceptual issues of central banks' own interest rate forecasts, namely how they are 
constructed and presented, what they mean and how they are related to market 
expectations of future policy rates. Section 3 describes the data and the construction 
of monetary policy and macro surprises. Section 4 presents the empirical results and 
Section 5 concludes. 
2  Central banks’ policy rate forecasts: conceptual issues 
This section briefly discusses a few conceptual issues which it is useful to clarify 
before embarking on the empirical analysis. We start by briefly describing how 
central banks construct an own interest rate path forecast. 
 
Since June 1997, the RBNZ has published a forecast for the 90-day bill rate as well as 
for the inflation rate and other key macroeconomic variables together with its 
Monetary Policy Statement (MPS), four times a year. The primary tool for the 
construction of the RBNZ's macroeconomic projections is the Forecasting and Policy 
System (FPS), a large macroeconomic model comprising more than 200 equations. 
While the published projections are model-based, they also incorporate judgemental 
adjustments reflecting the views of the staff, the advisory Monetary Policy Committee 
and ultimately the Governor. After convergence to a baseline projection has been 12
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achieved in an iterative process, the MPS with the central projections is eventually 
released under the authority of the Governor. The interest rate path and the other 
macroeconomic projections are published without confidence or uncertainty bands. 
 
Since November 2005, Norges Bank has published a forecast of its sight deposit rate 
with confidence bands together with its Monetary Policy Report, three times a year. 
Prior to that, Norges Bank published an inflation forecast which was constructed on 
the basis of the assumption of first constant interest rates (from March 2001 until mid 
2003) and then market interest rates. Before publishing an explicit forecast of the 
policy rate path up to three years ahead, Norges Bank published from summer 2004 a 
‘strategy interval’ for the policy rate four months ahead. The construction of the 
interest rate path and the forecasts of key economic variables are based on several 
macroeconomic models, a core model and a number of smaller models. In addition, 
Norges Bank also takes into account current statistics as well as information provided 
by its regional network and judgemental adjustments. The confidence bands of the 
interest rate forecast are calculated on the basis of the core model. 
 
The Swedish Riksbank has published a forecast of its repo rate with confidence bands 
together with its Monetary Policy Report, three times a year since February 2007. 
Before that, the Riksbank initially used to condition forecasts on the assumption of a 
constant interest rate (CIR). From October 2005, the Riksbank gave more prominence 
to projections based on market interest rate assumptions (MIR) relative to those based 
on constant interest rate assumptions (CIR) which were included only as an 
alternative scenario in the Inflation Report. 
 
The Riksbank’s forecasts are constructed on the basis of both formal models and 
expert assessment. On the model side, both models based on economic theory, 
notably a general equilibrium model of the Swedish economy called RAMSES, and 
more statistically oriented models are used. The model forecasts are then examined by 
the sector experts on the basis of common sense and aspects of reality which the 
models are unable to capture. The experts' assessment and the results of the models 
then serve as the basis for the main scenario. The Riksbank publishes the main 
scenario together with uncertainty bands, which are calculated from historical forecast 13
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errors for implied forward rates with an adjustment for the systematic forecast error in 
order to capture the existence of risk premia. 
 
Figures 1a to 1c show how the RBNZ, Norges Bank and the Riksbank present their 
interest rate forecasts respectively in their regular reports. The figures reveal that the 
policy rate is forecast approximately two years ahead, reflecting the time horizon over 
which the inflation target is attempted or required to be met. While the RBNZ 
publishes only the point forecast, Norges Bank and the Riksbank publish the point 
forecast together with fan charts in order to visualise the uncertainty surrounding the 
forecast. 
 
[Figures 1a-c near here] 
 
As is always stressed in the public communications of path-publishing central 
banks,
10 a published interest rate path is not a promise by the central bank. Rather, it 
is the central bank’s best guess, or forecast, at the time of the publication of the 
forecast, of the future path of policy rates, conditional on the information available up 
to that date. Obviously, unforeseeable future developments will yield ex post a policy 
rate path which may look quite different form the expected paths that have previously 
been published. This becomes evident when we compare the RBNZ's track record of 
published interest rate paths with the one that was actually delivered, displayed in 
Figure 2. To put the volatility of the RBNZ's policy path forecast into perspective, we 
show in Figure 3 the vintage of market expectations of the Riksbank’s policy rate 
(measured by implied forward rates) together with the realised policy rate path. As 
seen in the figure, market forecasts are also volatile and not very precise in predicting 
future policy rates. Yet, this does not imply that markets and central banks are poor 




[Figures 2, 3 near here] 
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In this context, it is also important to point out that the central bank's forecast of the 
policy rate path and implied market expectations do not need to (and usually do not) 
accord with each other, since markets and the central bank may have different 
assessments of the macroeconomic outlook. Indeed, path-publishing central banks 
commonly acknowledge that the alignment of market expectations with their forecast 
is neither to be expected nor desirable. 
 
However, discrepancies between the central bank’s forecast and market forecasts can 
at times be picked up as an issue in the financial press. Such a discrepancy was 
particularly significant when the Riksbank began to publish an interest rate path on 15 
February 2007. In the Monetary Policy report, the Riksbank stated that ‘The 
Riksbank's current assessment is that the repo rate needs to be raised by a further 0.25 
percentage points in February and by another 0.25 percentage points during the 
coming six months. There could then be a pause before it is time for a further 
increase.’ The release of the interest rate path attracted much attention in the media as 
the path implied a much more accommodative monetary policy than that anticipated 
by the markets. As a result, market rates shifted down after the report’s publication. 
However, market participants did not revise down the expected repo-rate path fully, 
leaving a noticeable gap between the implied forward rates and the Riksbank's path 
over the one to three year horizon, see Figure 4. The Riksbank's Deputy Governor, 
Irma Rosenberg, commented in a speech on the reactions to the publication of the 
Riksbank's own interest rate path in February 2007. The Deputy Governor played 
down the apparent differences between the markets’ and the Riksbank’s view about 
the future interest rate path: ‘The fact that other agents make their own assessments of 
how the interest rate will develop is essentially very positive. One of the arguments 
put forward against a central bank presenting its own forecast for the interest rate path 
was that the agents in the financial market would then stop making their own analyses 
of interest rate developments. However, these misgivings have proved unjustified.’ 
(Rosenberg, 2007). 
 
[Figure 4 near here] 
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3  Data and surprises 
Deriving monetary policy surprises 
The earlier literature which has gauged market reactions to the publication of central 
banks' interest rate paths has in general approached this issue by regressing asset price 
reactions on the surprise component embedded in the published path. The monetary 
policy surprise components have been derived in different ways. For instance, Archer 
(2005) defined the expected changes in the central bank's projection as the change in 
the market yield curve over the period starting three days after the previous projection 
until 5 minutes before the release of the new projection. The surprise component was 
then derived as the difference between the actual change in the projection and the 
expected change component. Ferrero and Secchi (2007) defined the monetary policy 
surprise in a similar manner but used daily data instead of intraday prices. Moessner 
and Nelson (2008) took yet another approach and derived two types of surprises. 
Their first proxy used the interest rate futures rate on the day prior to the publication 
of the forecast as the expected component and the second employed the previous 
central bank forecast made a quarter ago. Although useful, these approaches to 
deriving the surprise component cannot distinguish whether a monetary policy 
surprise results from the actual monetary policy decision deviating from analysts’ 
expectations or from the published path not being in line with market expectations. 
 
To try to capture and disentangle what is driving the overall surprise this paper 
defines both so-called “target surprises” and “path surprises” for Sweden, Norway and 
New Zealand. There are in general two approaches to extracting target surprises – 
survey based or financial market based measures. There are pros and cons for both. 
Survey based expectations are usually collected a few days before the monetary 
policy announcements and, as a result, any news or events taking place between the 
collection day and the decision day are not reflected in the surveys. Another argument 
against surveys is that investors do not ‘put their money where the mouth is’. On the 
other hand, analysts’ expectations are publicly available, and an analyst would run a 
reputation risk if his or her estimate systematically missed the actual outcome. An 
argument in favour of surveys is that survey estimates should in theory reflect 
investors ‘true’ expectations. This is contrary to expectations derived from financial 
markets where risk-premia can drive a wedge between the observed and true 16
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expectations. On the other hand, expectations from financial asset prices, apart from 
being derived from real bets by investors, are timely and can be extracted only 
minutes before the release of the monetary policy decision. 
 
Most studies on asset price reactions to monetary policy news have been conducted 
on economies where monetary policy expectations are easily available for long time 
periods (the United States, the euro area and the United Kingdom). However, as 
concerns the countries examined in this study - Sweden, Norway and New Zealand – 
data availability is more problematic. In particular, survey based expectations are 
available only for the past few years (Bloomberg survey data are available for New 
Zealand from 2001 and for Sweden and Norway from 2003).  
 
In order to use consistent data for the entire time series, we derive target surprises 
from financial markets for all countries. Daily changes (surrounding the actual 
decisions) in domestic 1-month interbank rates are used to proxy for the surprise. In 
more detail, we employ the 1-Month Stibor (Stockholm Interbank Offered Rate) rates 
listed at 11:05 a.m. for Sweden, the 1-Month Oslo Interbank Offer Rate (Oibor) set at 
noon each day for Norway and the 30-day bank bill yield also set at noon for New 
Zealand. Interbank rates normally tend to be good approximations of short-term risk-
free rates. The information content can however be distorted during periods of 
extreme financial stress. For instance the turmoil that got underway in July 2007 
sparked a sharp upturn in interbank rate volatility. Our results should not be distorted 
as this period of financial turbulence is outside of our sample. Over the sample under 
consideration, monetary policy decisions in Sweden and New Zealand have on all 
occasions been released earlier than the listing of interbank rates. Thus the 
standardised Riksbank and RBNZ surprise for a monetary policy decision taking 













          ( 1 )  
where St
MP,j represents the standardised monetary policy surprise at day t for country j 
(j=Sweden, New Zeal). it
1M, is the 1-month interbank rate at day t and ı is the sample 
standard deviation of the surprise components. Norges bank has throughout the 17
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sample announced their decisions no earlier than 14.00 (local time). As a result, the 
surprise component for Norway is calculated as it+1
1M – it
1M in eq. 1. 
 
One caveat regarding the use of bank rates is that they contain credit and liquidity risk 
components which can distort the information content. However, it is reasonable to 
assume that these components do not change substantially over very short periods of 
time and, in general, target surprises derived from market-based measures tend to be 
very similar to survey-based indicators. For the euro area and the US, the estimated 
correlation coefficient between the two is 0.75 for the ECB target surprises, and 0.8 
for the Fed target surprises, see Andersson (2007). To check the accuracy of the 
market based data used in this study, Figures 5 to 7 show scatter plots of target 
surprises using standard survey based data (when available) and the market based data 
(as described above). 
 
[Figures 5-7 near here] 
 
As can be seen, the data points are scattered around the 45 degree line and the 
coefficient of the regression line is very close to one. The strong similarities between 
the two measures suggest that the market based measure should accurately capture the 
investors' perceived surprise in the announced decision. 
 
The second type of monetary policy surprises - path surprises - are intended to capture 
news about revisions in the future path of policy. Methods of how to derive path 
surprises were first developed by Gürkaynak et al. (2007). Later on, Brand et al. 
(2006) and Andersson (2007) have applied slight variations of this method. This study 
defines the Path Surprise (PS) as the component of the change in around one-year-
ahead three-months implied future swap rates surrounding the monetary policy 
decision that is uncorrelated with the target surprise. In other words, the component of 
the change in forward swap rates that cannot be explained by the target surprise is 
defined as the PS: 
 18
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t PS TS IFR     ' E D        ( 2 )  
where  ǻIFR represents the changes in the implied forward rates, TS the target 
surprises and PS the path surprises. 
Extraction of macroeconomic data surprises 
In order to increase the estimation efficiency and minimise omitted variable bias, the 
surprise components of the most important macroeconomic releases are controlled for 
in the regressions. Surprise components are constructed as the difference between the 
official outcomes and the (median) forecasts obtained from surveys.
12 
 
We included the most important domestic macro variables that were available for a 
sufficiently long period of time: for New Zealand, CPI inflation, change in retail sales 
and the unemployment rate; for Norway, CPI inflation, change in retail sales and the 
unemployment rate; and for Sweden, CPI inflation, change in retail sales and the 
unemployment rate and consumer confidence. In addition, many papers have found 
that US news tend to move financial prices across the globe, see Andersson, Overby, 
and Sebestyén (2009). To control for this market feature, five US macro surprises, 
including CPI inflation, retail sales, non-farm payrolls, consumer confidence and ISM 
are added to the domestic regressions. For Sweden and Norway we also include the 
surprise component of the euro area HICP and the German IFO business climate 
release, both of which have been found to be important movers of European bond 
yields. Finally, a word of caution is warranted: even though we control for 
macroeconomic data releases which over time tend to exert a significant impact on 
bond yields, there are still market moving events that may influence bond yields. Such 
events can be firms’ earnings releases, Treasury auctions, political events and so on.  
Forward rates and benchmark bond yields 
The following section evaluates the impact monetary policy surprises have on five 
and ten-year government bond yields. As mentioned above, the path surprises in 
equation (2) are derived as the components of the change in expected future short 
rates surrounding the monetary policy decision that are uncorrelated with the target 
surprises. This approach can, however, induce some endogeneity problems in the 
regression statistics. To see this, the so-called expectation hypothesis states a link 19
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between short-term interest rates and long-term interest rates. This hypothesis is based 
on the general proposition that expectations about future short-term interest rates 
affect the current level of long-rates. Thus the n-period long term nominal interest rate 
i at time t, 
n
t i  can be expressed as: 
     >@ t n n t t t
n
t i E i E i E n i , 1 , 1 1 , 1 , 1 ... / 1 T            (3) 
where E1,t+i is the one-period yield which markets, at time t, expect to prevail at time 
t+i. ș is the term premium paid on an instrument with maturity n. Thus, as short-term 
interest rates are controlled by the central bank, monetary policy (in particular a 
policy surprise) also has an impact on long-term interest rates. With respect to ten-
year bond yields, however, the endogeneity issue should be deemed relatively small 
as it is derived from one small component in equation (3), namely the E1,t component. 
To account for this feature we add the five-year forward interest rate expected to 
prevail in five years’ time to the dependent variables. These forward rates have the 
additional advantage that they, at least in theory, should be unaffected by short-term 
business cycle news. As a consequence, central banks usually monitor these forward 
rates to gauge changes in market participants’ long-term growth and inflation 
expectations. 
 
The five and ten-year (and the forward) benchmark bond yields are derived from 
Datastream, using the codes BMXX10Y and BMXX05Y, where XX represents the 
two digit country codes for New Zealand, Norway and Sweden.  
4 Empirical  Analysis   
As mentioned in the introduction, the main aim of this paper is to evaluate the effects 
of quantitative forward guidance provided by the RBNZ, the Riksbank and Norges 
Bank. Three avenues are pursued; the first concerns the predictability of monetary 
policy decisions, the second whether quantitative forward guidance has helped to 
anchor long-term inflation expectations, and the third whether a move towards interest 
rate path publication increases a central bank's leverage on the term-structure of 
interest rates. We use descriptive statistics to evaluate the predictability issue while 
regression analysis will be employed to tackle the two latter points. Throughout this 
section we will employ identical samples for RBNZ and the Riksbank (covering the 20
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period January 1999 to January 2007). This enables us to compare two central banks 
that share similar policy frameworks, but differ in the sense that the RBNZ's is more 
explicit in its forward communication (via the publication of an own interest rate 
path). For Norway, the sample is split before and after their decision to publish an 
own interest rate path (in November 2005). Such a sample split helps to gauge to what 
extent markets' reactions to Norges bank’s communication have changed after it 
decided to publish its best guess about future policy rates. 
 
(i) Does publication of an interest rate path enhance the short-term predictability of 
monetary policy and help to avoid policy surprises? 
Predictability is of the essence for a central bank because it enhances the effectiveness 
of monetary policy. In this respect it is common to distinguish between short-term 
predictability and long-term predictability. Short-term predictability is usually defined 
as the degree to which the public is able to anticipate upcoming monetary policy 
decisions. The longer term dimension of central bank predictability has more to do 
with the fact that the public should be able to understand the central bank's monetary 
policy framework (see ECB 2006 and Blattner et al. 2008 for a more thorough 
discussion). 
 
In this sub-section we focus on short-term predictability and make use of the above-
derived target and path surprises. Figure 8 shows the unconditional mean of both 
target and path surprises for the three economies. As is evident from the rather low 
level of target and path surprises, all three central banks have been successful in 
communicating their monetary policy intentions in a transparent manner. 
Furthermore, the target surprises are of similar magnitude for both RBNZ and the 
Riksbank while RBNZ's path surprises, on average, have been slightly higher than 
those of the Riksbank. This latter feature suggests that the RBNZ's decision to publish 
its own interest rate path has not had any significant short-term predictability benefits, 
at least in comparison to the Riksbank. 
 
[Figure 8 near here] 
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For Norges Bank, it seems that its short-term predictability improved after the 
introduction of the interest rate path. In fact, both target and path surprises declined 
significantly after November 2005. It should, however, be noted that the 2005 to mid-
2007 period was characterised by a tranquil financial market environment. Such a 
favourable environment probably made it easier for market participants to anticipate 
upcoming monetary policy decisions. 
 
(ii) Does the introduction of an interest rate path help to anchor long-term inflation 
expectations? 
To examine to what extent the three central banks have been able to anchor long-term 
inflation expectations we use a standard regression framework. The Fisher hypothesis 
states that the yields offered on government bonds consist of three components, a real 
rate component, an inflation expectation component and a premium demanded for 
investing in longer term securities. The real rate component is, in turn, closely related 
to an economy's economic growth prospects. By assuming that market participants’ 
economic growth expectations five to ten years into the future as well as the   
term premia they demand over this horizon are broadly constant, changes in far- 
ahead forward rates should be related primarily to revisions in long-term inflation 
expectations, as seen through the eyes of investors (see Gürkaynak et al. 2005). Thus, 
if monetary policy (and other macroeconomic) surprises are unable to significantly 
move the yields onhis long-term horizon, this would provide evidence that market  
participants' long-term inflation expectations are well anchored.
13 
 
To test this hypothesis we employ a standard exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model 
proposed by Nelson (1991). This set-up is similar to previous studies investigating the 
effect of monetary policy surprises and communication on market interest rates, e.g. 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007). We explore both mean and volatility effects of 
monetary policy surprises and macro news surprises on five-year forward rates.
14 
 
For completeness we also replicate this regression for five and ten year government 
bond spot rates. The benchmark case estimates the following mean equation: 
t t t t t t X PS TS r r H J J E D  )    '    '  2 1 1     (4) 22
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where ǻrt represents daily changes in forward rates/benchmark bond yields, TS is the 
monetary policy target surprise, PS is the monetary policy path surprise and X is a 
matrix containing domestic, US and euro area macro economic news. 
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where DM is a dummy variable equal to one on days of monetary policy decisions 
and zero otherwise and DX is a vector of dummies for the domestic, US and euro area 
macro news (taking respectively the value one on days the news are revealed and zero 
otherwise). Two main results can be seen in Table 1. First, target and path surprises, 
across economies (and across samples in the case of Norway), have lower coefficient 
values and lower significance for the implied five-year forward interest rates 
compared to the five and ten-year spot yields. This suggests that long-term inflation 
expectations have been relatively well anchored in the three economies over the 
sample periods. 
 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
 
Second, this pattern also holds for the vast majority of domestic and foreign 
macroeconomic news. An important market mover appears to be the surprise in US 
non-farm payroll releases, which is found to significantly move bond yields for all 
three economies, across maturities, except for Norway over the more recent sample 
period. The fact that relatively few monetary policy surprises and macro news exert 
significant influence on long-term forward rates contrasts with findings for the United 
States found by Gürkaynak et al. (2005). The authors state that ‘our empirical results 
are all consistent with a model that we present in which private agents' views of [US] 
long-run inflation are not strongly anchored’ (page 425). One plausible explanation 
for the contrasting results may be that all three economies included in this study have 23
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a clear inflation mandate which differs from the Federal Reserve's informal approach 
to a long-run inflation objective. This explanation is also supported by Gürkaynak et 
al. (2006) who find evidence that Swedish and UK long-term inflation compensation 
embedded in bond yields has been insensitive to economic news during the period 
when the economies have operated under a clear inflation targeting mandate 
 
(iii) Does quantitative guidance in the form of interest rate path publication improve 
central banks' leverage over the term structure of interest rates? 
When an interest rate path is released, financial markets are provided with detailed 
quantitative information about the prospective future course of policy. One might 
therefore conjecture that on these days markets may be more reactive to the forward 
looking communication, which would imply that bond yields respond more strongly 
to the path surprise. From a tactical central bank communication perspective, this 
would open a way to exert a larger influence (i.e. greater leverage) on longer-term 
bond yields. For instance, assume that a central bank wishes to steer bond yields in a 
certain direction and that history has shown that they are able to ‘move the markets’ 
more when they publish a path. If that were the case, then the central bank would be 
more successful in steering the markets by direct forward guidance rather than by 
means of a speech or some other form of verbal guidance. 
 
Owing to the limited number of interest rate paths published by Norges Bank between 
November 2005 and June 2007, the assessment of this conjecture is based solely on a 
comparative analysis of New Zealand and Sweden. To this end, we extend the 
EGARCH model estimated in the previous sub-section by interacting the monetary 
policy surprises with a dummy variable Dt
fguid which is equal to one on days when an 
interest rate path in the case of New Zealand and the inflation forecast in the case of 
the Riksbank was released and zero on the occasions when the two central banks only 





t t t t t X D PS PS D TS TS r r H J J J J E D  )      '    '  4 3 2 1 1  (6) 
If quantitative forward-looking guidance induces increased central bank leverage on 
the term structure of interest rates, we would expect the coefficient on the dummy-
interacted path surprise to be positive and significant. The expected size and sign of 
the coefficient of the dummy-interacted target surprise is not clear a priori. Obviously, 24
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the sample is relatively limited and the results should be interpreted accordingly. 
There are 34 occasions for New Zealand when an interest rate forecast was released, 
and 31 occasions for Sweden when an inflation forecast was released. 
 
Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients for the monetary policy surprises. For New 
Zealand we find that the effect of the path surprise is consistently larger when an 
interest rate path was published (see Panel A). However, it is only significant for the 
five year segment. The effect of the target surprise, on the other hand, is found to be 
smaller, which could be interpreted as reflecting a shift in the bond markets' focus 
from the very near term monetary policy stance (as captured by the target surprise) to 
the more distant monetary policy outlook (as captured by the path surprise).
15 The 
coefficient estimates suggest that the RBNZ can potentially obtain an enhanced 
leverage over medium term bond yields on the days when it publishes a policy rate 
path, since the elasticity of the five year bond yield to the path surprise is almost twice 
as large on these days as normally. For Sweden, interest rates do not show any extra 
sensitivity on the days the Riksbank publishes its monetary policy report (see Panel 
B). Overall, these findings provide some mild support for the notion that publication 
of an interest rate path forecast may enhance the central bank’s leverage over 
medium-term interest rates.  
 
[Table 2 near here] 
5 Conclusions 
The perceived primary advantage of publishing an own interest rate path is that it 
would enhance the central banks ability to steer expectations, thereby enhancing the 
predictability of monetary policy, the anchoring of inflation expectations and the 
leverage of monetary policy over longer term interest rates. This paper assesses 
these hypotheses in the following ways. First, we test if the publication of an own 
interest rate path can enhance the predictability of monetary policy, i.e. help avoid 
policy surprises and thereby reduce financial market volatility. This is evaluated by 
examining the size of the three central banks' target and path surprises. Second, 
by examining the sensitivity of long-term domestic government bond yields (both 
spot and forward) to derived path and target surprises, we are able to evaluate if the 
publication of an interest rate path has anchored investors' long-term inflation 25
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expectations. Third, one of the main arguments in favour of publishing an interest rate 
path is that it may improve the banks' leverage over the term structure of interest 
rates. We test this issue empirically by examining whether the medium and long-term 
yield effect of path surprises is stronger on the days when the central bank publishes 
its interest rate path forecast or not. This part of the analysis benefits from the fact that 
all three central banks under investigation pursue the practice of releasing their 
forward guidance, i.e. their Inflation or Monetary Policy Reports with their forecasts, 
always on days when also monetary policy decisions are taken. 
 
The analysis is based on two comparisons: first, a comparative analysis for the RBNZ 
and the Riksbank over a sample period were the RBNZ, but not the Riksbank 
published an own interest rate forecast; and second, a comparative analysis for Norges 
Bank over two different sub-samples, when an interest rate forecast was published in 
the second sub-sample, but not in the first. 
 
The main findings of the paper are the following. First, we find that all three central 
banks have been highly predictable in their monetary policy decisions and that long-
term inflation expectations have been well anchored in the three economies, 
irrespective of whether forward guidance involved publication of an own interest rate 
path or not. The first comparative analysis reveals that monetary policy surprises are 
found to be of similar magnitude for both the RBNZ and the Riksbank, and that there 
is no evidence that long-term yields are better anchored in New Zealand than in 
Sweden. The sub-sample analysis for Norges Bank reveals that policy surprises have 
become smaller after November 2005, when Norges Bank started to publish an 
interest rate path. This latter period was, however, also characterised by very low 
volatility in the global economy and financial markets in general, which might also 
have contributed to lower policy surprises. Regarding long-term inflation expectations 
in Norway, there is no evidence that they have been better anchored after November 
2005 than before. These findings suggest that if the central bank already operates 
under a monetary policy framework characterised by a clearly defined price stability 
objective and a high degree of transparency, publication of an interest rate path does 
not appear to enhance the short-term predictability of monetary policy and the 
anchoring of long-term inflation expectations. 26
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The second main finding, obtained from the comparison between RBNZ and the 
Riksbank, is that the publication of an interest rate path appears to increase the 
sensitivity of medium term bond yields to forward-looking monetary policy news and 
to reduce sensitivity to news about current policy stance. In New Zealand, five-year 
bond yields are found to respond more weakly to the target surprise and substantially 
more strongly to the forward looking path surprise on the days when the RBNZ 
publishes its interest rate path. In contrast to this, bond yields in Sweden are not found 
to have responded differently to monetary policy surprises on the days when the 
Riksbank published its report with the inflation forecast. This empirical finding 
suggests that explicit quantitative guidance, in the form of the publication of an 
interest rate path, may potentially enhance a central bank's leverage on the medium 
term structure of interest rates. 
 
For completeness, it is important to note that there are other aspects of publishing an 
own interest rate path on top of the predictability, inflation-expectations anchoring 
and leverage issues which have been the focus in this paper. There are, for instance, 
further potential advantages such as avoiding a number of technical problems 
associated with the adoption of the constant interest rate (CIR) or the market interest 
rate (MIR) approach in the construction of central banks' macroeconomic forecasts
16 
and the establishment of a more forward looking framework for internal policy 
deliberations. At the same time, there are also potential disadvantages. In particular, it 
might in practice be difficult for a monetary policy committee to agree on an entire 
future path of policy rates rather than merely on the level of the policy rate today 
(Goodhart 2001), an argument whose relevance obviously grows with the size of the 
decision making body.
17 Also, publishing an own interest rate forecast might be 
interpreted by the public as an unconditional promise (Mishkin 2004, Goodhart 2009) 
or central banks might be unwilling to revise their path for reasons of prestige 
(Gersbach and Hahn 2008), which might impede required adjustments of the path to 
changes in economic conditions. These latter issues are difficult to test empirically. 
However, the fact, which we have documented in this paper, that the RBNZ has over 
time made quite sizeable revisions in its published interest rate path without causing 
major disruptions in the markets or suffering a loss in credibility points to a 
potentially limited relevance of these issues. Finally, there is the issue whether 
constructing a publishable interest rate path should be considered a pre-eminent issue 27
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for central banks with scarce resources.
18 This potential caveat might, however, be 
qualified if fewer resources would need to be devoted to other ways of policy 
signalling when a path was published.
19 
 
Overall, the relevance of the various potential advantages and disadvantages of 
publishing an own interest rate path will depend to a large extent on the specific 
situation at the individual central bank, such as the importance of the inflation forecast 
in the monetary policy strategy and the size of the decision making body. 28
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1 Norges Bank started to publish an explicit policy rate path in November 2005. A 
‘strategy interval’ for the policy rate four months ahead had been published since 
summer 2004. 
2 In 2007, Bank of England Deputy Governor Lomax (2007) stated that the Bank of 
England was considering publishing an own interest rate path, but more recent 
statements from the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committe sound more 
dismissive. For instance, Bank of England Chief Economist Spencer Dale (2009) 
recently stated that “[t]he Committee’s preferred approach is to describe its 
assessment of the outlook for output and inflation, and allow the public and markets 
to make their own assessment of the likely future path of interest rates.” 
3 For a recent survey, see Blinder et al. (2008). 
4 For both the Swedish Riksbank and the Czech National Bank the period over which 
an interest rate path has been published is still too short to allow an empirical 
assessment of its effects. For the Riksbank there is, however, an interesting study by 
Andersson, Dillén and Sellin (2006) investigating the effect of the various 
communication tools of the Riksbank (e.g. speeches, release of the Inflation Report) 
on market interest rates for the period before quantitative forward guidance was 
adopted.  
5 Overall, there is strong evidence that the ability of financial markets to predict 
monetary policy has in general increased over the last decade, which provides 
evidence of the beneficial effects of the transparent approach to monetary policy 
adopted by central banks around the world in the recent past on the predictability of 
monetary policy. For a survey of the literature, see Blattner et al. (2008). 
6 An interesting finding of the literature on this subject is that macroeconomic news 
appear to have a stronger and more significant effect on long-term interest rates or far 
ahead forward interest rates in the US (Gürkaynak et al. 2005), than in the euro area 
(Brand et al. 2006, Beechey et al. 2007) or the UK and Sweden (Gürkaynak et al. 
2007), which is interpreted as suggesting that inflation expectations are less anchored 
in the US than in these three other economies.  
7 The Reserve Bank of New Zealand's inflation target is currently specified as a range 
for annual CPI inflation of 1-3% over the medium term. Before September 2002 the 29
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range was 0-3%. The Riksbank's inflation target is an annual change in the consumer 
price index (CPI) of around 2 per cent per year, with a tolerance range of plus/minus 1 
percentage point. 
8 Quantitative indicators of central bank transparency (e.g. Dincer and Eichengreen 
2007 and Eijffinger and Geraats 2006) commonly characterise the RBNZ and the 
Riksbank as being among the most transparent central banks in the world. 
9 Norges Bank's operational inflation target is an annual consumer price inflation of 
2.5% over time. 
10 A typical example is the statement by Riksbank Deputy Governor Rosenberg 
(2007): ‘I would therefore like to emphasise once again that the repo rate path we 
present in the Monetary Policy Report is a forecast and not a promise. The Riksbank 
cannot undertake, regardless of what happens in the economy, to follow the path 
published. The interest rate path is quite simply the best assessment we can make at a 
given point in time, given the information that is then available. New information may 
change the picture of the economy and then the Executive Board will have to rethink 
how we set the repo rate.’  (Rosenberg, 2007). 
11 See Goodhart and Lim (2009) for a recent empirical assessment of the (in)ability of 
central banks and markets to forecast the future path of policy rates. 
12 The data were obtained from Bloomberg and Haver DLX. 
13 A more direct approach would be to assess the anchoring of implied long-term 
inflation compensation backed out from the forward rates of nominal and index-
linked bonds, as has been done by Beechey and Wright (2008) for the US. We did not 
pursue this avenue here because of an insufficient number of on-the-run index-linked 
bonds for the three economies. 
14 An alternative approach would be to gauge the impact on shorter forward rates such 
as one-year implied forward rates in nine years’ time. As benchmark yields (with high 
liquidity) are available in the five year and ten year segments, we believe the 
information content in longer-term implied forward rates (i.e. five year forward rate 
five years ahead) to be less distorted than shorter-term implied forward rates (e.g. one 
year forward rate nine years ahead). 
15 This pattern is similar to that obtained by Swiston (2007) in an assessment of the 
implications of the issuance of FOMC statements on the effect of monetary policy 
surprises on US bond yields. He finds that the introduction of the statements led to a 30
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reduction in the effect of the short-term monetary policy surprise and an increase in 
the surprise about the more distant prospective level of policy rates.   
16 See Goodhart (2009) for a thorough discussion of the alternative interest rate 
conditioning assumptions of central bank forecasts.  
17 This point was, however, challenged by Svensson (2003) who argues that agreeing 
on an interest rate path would not be more complicated than agreeing on an inflation 
or output growth forecast path. As a practical matter, he suggested letting each MPC 
member draw his preferred future interest rate path on paper and then taking the 
median of the individual paths. 
18 This point was made by Lars Heikensten in a comment on our paper at the 6
th 
Norges Bank Monetary Policy Conference.  
19 Indeed, according to a comment made by Lars Svensson at the 6
th Norges Bank 
Monetary Policy Conference and also a speech by Rosenberg (2007), the Riksbank 
makes less use of signalling via e.g. speeches and statements since it has been 
publishing its own policy path.    31
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Table 1 Baseline results for New Zealand, Sweden and Norway 
Panel A: New Zealand
Five Ten Five year Forward
Mean Volatility Mean Volatility Mean Volatility
lag -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 *
Target Surprise 3.43 *** 2.22 *** 0.94
Path Surprise 4.42 *** -0.43 *** 3.56 *** -0.31 *** 2.57 *** -0.29 ***
NZ cpi 2.43 ** -0.02 1.78 *** -0.01 1.49 0.02
NZ rsa 1.17 ** 0.11 * 0.79 0.10 ** 0.50 0.05
NZ unempl -9.68 *** -0.12 -7.68 *** -0.17 * -3.45 -0.02
US cpi 0.33 -0.14 0.40 -0.09 0.51 -0.14 *
US rsa 0.85 0.12 * 0.68 0.16 ** 0.39 0.11 *
US nfp 2.01 *** 0.01 2.42 *** 0.09 2.63 *** 0.01
US ISM 1.55 *** 0.08 1.86 *** 0.14 * 1.79 *** 0.08
Panel B: Sweden
Five Ten Five year Forward
Mean Volatility Mean Volatility Mean Volatility
lag 0.04 ** 0.03 ** 0.03
Target Surprise 1.73 *** 1.08 * 0.53
Path Surprise 2.16 *** 0.07 1.84 *** 0.12 ** 1.41 ** 0.12 **
SW cpi 2.31 *** 0.06 1.20 *** 0.17 * 0.25 0.12 **
S E  r s a 0 . 5 90 . 0 40 . 2 90 . 0 50 . 0 20 . 2 2 * * *
SW unempl -0.82 ** 0.03 -0.64 * -0.10 -0.58 -0.25 ***
US cpi 0.37 ** -0.05 0.29 0.01 0.25 0.14 **
US rsa 2.12 *** 0.01 1.79 *** 0.01 1.50 *** 0.09 *
US nfp 2.67 *** 0.01 2.41 *** -0.04 2.02 *** -0.40 ***
US ISM 2.97 *** 0.47 *** 1.71 *** 0.49 *** 0.38 0.95 ***
E A  c p i 0 . 8 3 * *- 0 . 0 7 0 . 6 3 - 0 . 1 8 0 . 7 2 * *- 0 . 5 5 * * *
EA ifo 0.81 ** -0.14 ** 0.70 *** -0.16 ** 0.54 -0.16 ***
Panel C1: Norway 2001 - 2005
Five Ten Five year Forward
Mean Volatility Mean Volatility Mean Volatility
lag 0.06 ** 0.09 *** -0.08 ***
Target Surprise 3.73 *** 2.00 *** 0.36
Path Surprise 5.74 *** 0.28 *** 2.47 *** -0.16 -1.35 -0.38 ***
NO cpi 3.78 *** 0.04 1.84 *** -0.06 -0.10 -0.14 ***
NO rsa 0.46 0.31 *** 0.32 0.41 *** 0.39 0.17 ***
NO unempl -1.42 0.22 *** -0.03 -0.02 1.40 * -0.16 ***
US cpi 0.52 -0.05 -0.62 -0.12 -0.84 -0.19 ***
US rsa 1.56 * 0.08 * 1.55 ** 0.27 * 1.93 *** 0.03 ***
US nfp 1.90 *** -0.47 *** 3.26 *** 0.02 4.42 *** -0.24 ***
US ISM 1.82 *** 0.62 *** 1.47 *** 0.41 ** 0.51 0.51 ***
EA cpi -0.14 0.52 *** -0.69 0.07 -0.69 0.15 ***
EA ifo 1.43 *** -0.35 *** 0.92 ** -0.35 *** 0.76 ** -0.20 ***
Panel C2: Norway 2005 - 2007
Five Ten Five year Forward
Mean Volatility Mean Volatility Mean Volatility
lag 0.04 * 0.02 -0.20 ***
Target Surprise 4.19 *** 1.62 -0.36
Path Surprise 2.24 * 0.12 *** 1.54 * 0.20 *** 1.89 0.60 ***
NO cpi 2.26 *** 0.52 *** 1.75 *** 0.23 *** 1.19 0.32 ***
NO rsa 1.03 0.02 *** -0.99 * -0.01 -2.30 ** -0.07 ***
NO unempl -1.29 *** -0.11 *** -1.94 *** -0.19 *** -2.68 *** 0.03
US cpi -0.15 0.16 *** 0.06 -0.09 *** 0.53 -0.09 ***
U S  r s a 1 . 3 00 . 1 6 * * * 0 . 9 50 . 1 5 * * * 0 . 6 30 . 4 3 * * *
US nfp 1.62 *** 0.00 0.77 ** 0.14 *** -0.41 -0.23 ***
US ISM -0.14 0.06 *** -0.83 0.06 *** -1.45 0.46 ***
EA cpi -0.67 -0.02 0.77 -0.33 *** 1.14 -0.28 ***
EA ifo 0.41 -0.46 *** 0.54 -0.04 *** 0.45 0.24 ***  
*,**,**, denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 35
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Table 2 Extended regression results for New Zealand and Sweden 
Panel A: New Zealand
Five Ten Five year Forward
Mean Mean Mean
Target Surprise 3.74 *** 2.99 *** 2.15 ***
Path Surprise 2.96 *** 2.45 *** 1.77 ***
Target Surprise DP -0.65 *** -1.85 *** -2.98 ***
Path Surprise DP 2.27 ** 1.63 1.17
Exclusion test 7.51 *** 5.14 2.65
Panel B: Sweden
Five Ten Five year Forward
Mean Mean Mean
Target Surprise 1.71 *** 0.88 *** 0.08
Path Surprise 2.35 *** 1.79 *** 1.29 *
Target Surprise DR 0.12 0.33 0.56
Path Surprise DR -0.47 0.01 0.10
Exclusion test 0.33 0.06 0.43  
*,**,***, denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. ‘Exclusion 
test’ reports the significance level of a Likelihood ratio test of the null 
hypothesis that all dummy-interacted monetary policy variables can be 
excluded from the model. For New Zealand, there are 34 occasions when 
an interest rate forecast was released and for Sweden 31 occasions when 
inflation forecast was released. 36
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Figure 1: Key policy rate and interest rate paths for New Zealand, 
Norway and Sweden 
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Figure 2: Track record for RBNZ own interest rate path  
(January 1999 – January 2007)  












Figure 3: Track record for market based forecasts of Sveriges Riksbank 
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Figure 4: Riksbank repo rate forecast and market expectations in 
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Figure 5: Survey based (y-axis) and marketd based (x-axis) measures of 
monetary policy target surprises for New Zealand 
(in basis points, April 2001 – June 2007) 
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Figure 6: Survey based (y-axis) and market based (x-axis) measures of 
monetary policy target surprises for Norway 
(in basis points, June 2003 – June 2007) 











Figure 7: Survey based (y-axis) and market based (x-axis) measures of 
monetary policy target surprises for Sweden 
(in basis points, October 1999 – June 2007) 
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Figure 8: Average absolute target and path surprises of the Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand, the Riksbank and Norges Bank 
(Sample period: for New Zealand and Sweden: January 1999 – January 
2007, Norway 1: March 2001 – October 2005, Norway 2: November 
2005 – June 2007) 
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